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Reconsidering State-Society Relations in South Asia: 
A Himalayan Case Study
Since the mid-eighteenth century when armies 
serving the English East India Company (EIC) 
clashed with the Gorkhali power, British 
officers depicted Nepal as an example of 
classical Hindu despotism. Subsequent 
scholars of the region have not quite challenged 
these representations, mostly taking such 
colonial descriptors as ‘facts.’ 
This essay demonstrates that the Nepali state 
evolved through methods of rule rather than 
through the performance of rituals and war. It 
traces a brief trajectory of the development 
of the Gorkhali legal sovereignty by examining 
the processes of governance including alliance 
building, management of disputes, and 
rationalization of administrative, and judicial 
structures. 
I argue that the frequency and volume of 
petitions to royal authority made by the 
subjects from a cross-section of Nepali 
population, in the attempt to redress wrongs, 
particularly problematizes the received notion 
of that society being ruled by arbitrary system. 
Repeated emphasis on justice administration 
enabled the Gorkhali state to simultaneously 
incorporate multifarious groups into its 
expanding network through grants and titles, 
and subordinate them to rules created at 
the center. The essay offers glimpses into a 
state that was simultaneously coercive and 
consensual, extractive and re-distributive.
Keywords: caste, justice, kingship, law, Nepal, state.
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Introduction
Nepal’s ‘non-coloniality’ has often precluded its compara-
bility to the larger sub-continental historic experience in 
the scholarship (Des Chene 2007). Ironically, the colonial 
knowledge regimes operating from India were at the 
forefront of generating the earliest and most authorita-
tive accounts of Nepal.1 The military and administrative 
officers of the East India Company (EIC) traversing the 
foothills of the Himalayas provided the first paradigmatic 
interpretation of the modern Nepali polity (Hamilton 1819; 
Kirkpatrick 1971; Hogdson 1880). Borrowing heavily from 
the ubiquitous template of ‘Oriental Despotism’ in Asia, the 
EIC depicted Gorkhali rulers too as quintessential Hindu 
tyrants for whom violence was innate not instrumental.2 
Particularly, the EIC accounts emphasized the ‘savage’ na-
ture and ‘oppressive’ violence of its emerging rival, as both 
competed for territory along the Himalayan corridor in the 
wake of receding Mughal authority. Subsequent scholars 
of the region have not quite challenged these represen-
tations, taking such colonial descriptors at face value.3 
Nationalist historians on the other hand have glorified the 
Gorkhali military conquests as constituting the fulcrum 
of its sovereignty, and assigned it the honorable title of 
‘unification’. In nationalist narratives, ‘unification’ appears 
as a logical telos uniting a fragmented nation, guiding it to 
modernity (Pant 1985; D. R. Regmi 1975; Shah 1990).4 Yet 
this representation of the state as a sovereign historical 
object and a collective subject of modernity elides a rather 
complex trajectory of its formation and evolution. Both 
the nationalist and the colonial representations of Nepal 
do not examine state building as a process, the outcomes 
of which were not pre-ordained but contingent (Michael 
1999; Onta 1995).
Mahesh C. Regmi, who offered the first sustained critique 
of the nationalist narrative, placed the land-tax nexus at 
the center of the Nepali state-making account (M. C. Regmi 
1963; 1971). The doyen of Nepali economic history howev-
er held the ‘motely character’ of the land tenures and tax 
assessments as illustrative of a state marked by unpre-
dictability and extractive nature (Regmi 1977: 51). Regmi 
argued that the lack of private property in land, arbitrary 
rules, and oppressive tax demands on peasantry precluded 
the growth of a strong state. Regmi’s firm focus on land 
tenures and the policy driven nature of his works prevent-
ed him from evaluating differential systems of labor, dues, 
and rights operating under the ambit of the evolving state 
power to which he inadvertently imputed a despotic char-
acter.5 An explicit economic determinism underpinning his 
works did not challenge the prevailing imagery of Nepal as 
a static society caught in tyranny and disconnected from 
its rulers. Few western scholars have documented the 
post-1816 state as a qualitatively different entity (Burghart 
1984; English 1985). Notwithstanding the importance of the 
Treaty of Sagauli (1816), these scholars however did not 
fully explain (beyond theoretical speculations) as to how 
the Anglo-Gorkha War engendered concrete steps towards 
Gorkhali state-making from within.6 Locating the agency 
of change in Nepali society elsewhere equally risks missing 
the deeper and indigenous roots of Gorkhali power ex-
tending back into the eighteenth century. Some influential 
bodies of anthropological works on Nepal have alternative-
ly underscored the role of rituals in the making of Gorkhali 
kingship and state (Höfer 1979; Lecomte-Tilouine 2009; 
Michaels 2005; Quigley 2005). However, the general conclu-
sions of these works have not moved the debate away from 
the Dumontian and Hocartian paradigms of power.7 This 
has particularly overshadowed the study of the 1854 Ain, 
which remains prodigiously focused on caste hierarchy 
and its associated purity.8 As a result, the conspicuous role 
played by administrative legislations in regulating wide 
arrays of socio-economic relations in nineteenth century 
Nepal remains poorly examined.
Without dismissing the role played by the early Gorkh-
ali military success, this essay proposes an alternative 
narrative of Gorkhali rule wherein Gorkhali manipulation 
of social and cultural practices played an important role 
in molding the building blocks of the state alongside the 
management of land and rituals. It particularly sheds light 
on aspects of state-society relations that have hitherto 
warranted the least attention, especially those pertaining 
to the construction of early state authority. I hope to show 
that the foundations of the Gorkhali state were built on the 
projection of its legal sovereignty that encompassed both 
secular and religious aspects of social life. From the closing 
decades of the eighteenth century, the nascent kingdom 
expanded its judicial power to check both official irregu-
larities and manage a gamut of social relations. Overtime, 
the Gorkhali emphasis on building legitimacy through 
deliverance of justice and regulation of intimate aspects of 
social lives bonded diverse populations to the state on the 
one hand, and became a vehicle to project power in areas 
controlled by competing groups on the other. 
It was not simply centralization of rituals and taxes, but 
also of information, loyalty, and justice administration 
that deepened Gorkhali sovereignty in rural Nepal. For 
sovereignty to be effective at the grassroots it had to be 
relatable in everyday life and imagination. The swiftness 
and impartiality with which the state delivered justice 
rooted it in popular imagination, and the resulting order 
was processual—not homeostatic.
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Markers of Early Gorkhali Rule: Whose Leviathan?
When the small chiefdom of Gorkha emerged into a large 
territorial unit during the mid-eighteenth century, it had 
to accommodate various local power holders (Acharya & 
Naraharinath 2061 VS: 44). The immense ethnic, geograph-
ic, cultural, and administrative diversity on the ground 
thwarted immediate Gorkhali endeavors to radically alter 
existing socio-economic relations.9 Time and again, the 
Gorkhali state relied on different strata of society to carry 
out administrative and judicial functions.10 One Bhagavan-
tanath, who had assisted Prithvi Narayan in his various 
territorial campaigns, was awarded with lavish titles and 
land grants, including rights to judiciary functions (Vajra-
carya 1975: 98-101). The fact that the descendants of the 
several vanquished chiefs continued to receive large sums 
of cash pension from the state throughout the nineteenth 
and into the twentieth century shows that collaboration 
was a defining feature of Gorkhali statecraft.11 It seems 
that since any larger political entity had to be built out of 
negotiations with hundreds of local power holders, village 
headmen, and revenue officials, the terms of social rela-
tions and power hierarchies largely remained embedded 
in the existing system (Vajracarya & Nepal 2014 VS: 25). 
This necessity to collaborate extended beyond the context 
of controlling the Kathmandu Valley (Naraharinath 2022 
VS: 16-17). In the Eastern region, local village headmen and 
chiefs were granted considerable autonomy in return for 
accepting Gorkhali authority. Any attempt to undermine 
the existing balance of power in rural Nepal was swiftly 
addressed. For instance, in 1793 upon being informed of 
the irregularity committed by an official, Ram Das, in the 
registration of kipat (system of land tenure) holdings, the 
state intervened swiftly.12 In addition to returning the kipat 
land, the Rai (local ruling elites) were given the authority 
to collect fines, and oversee general administration.13 The 
Gorkhali rulers likewise brought military ascetic fraterni-
ties, Tharus (ethnic group) and various other groups from 
the old power centers in the southern plains into the ambit 
of their expanding network (Guneratne 2002; Shrestha 
2058 VS).
Let us briefly look at some of these examples. In 1792 the 
Kathmandu Durbar restored the property of Jarobar Kha-
was who had served the Sen kings of Makwanpur.14 Jarobar 
Khawas was later incorporated into the Gorkhali state as 
a Subba (governor) of Saptari and Mahottari districts in 
the Terai.15 A few years later, in 1798, the state made a 
lavish grant of 301 bighas (measurement of land= 5/8 acre) 
in Rautahat district to Gosain (ascetic order) Jamuna Giri, 
entrusting him with settling virgin lands and overseeing 
judicial and administrative functions.16 Since the success 
of early state-building relied on the political incorpora-
tion of multitudes of intermediaries anchored on an idea 
of shared sovereignty, these recipients of Gorkhali titles 
and grants were more than just office-holders. They were 
“partners and co-sharers of the realm”, acting as a vital 
link between the state and society (Wink 1986: 187), a point 
aptly summarized in a letter of Prithvi Narayan Shah to the 
king of Jajarkot in 1769 (Naraharinath 1966: 4).17 Through 
much of the eighteenth century, the Gorkhali rulers relied 
on many such intermediary groups to collect tax and over-
see law and order (RRC 34: 295-296). And while in theory 
the king was supposed to be the sole owner of the land, the 
majority of cultivable lands were already in the hereditary 
possession of various social groups.18 Any new transfer 
of unclaimed or forested land to groups or individuals 
carried the clear title of proprietorship as long as the land 
remained cultivated. A large chunk of the revenue thus 
went to various intermediaries, rural magnates, and local 
elites. Most administrative functions too were left to the 
local rulers and there is no evidence of systematic checks 
against embezzlement before 1780.19 Depending on the se-
verity of the case, the regime at most warned the accused 
not to repeat it. One could draw here a parallel between 
Guha’s description of the eighteenth century Maratha state 
and the early nineteenth century Gorkhali system. Both 
were characterized by wide discretion and great latitude 
that was “diffused among a variety of institutions and 
shared by many different persons” (Guha 1995: 126). 
While these structures of collaborations enabled the 
Kathmandu based authority to control vast territories 
without large administrative footprints, the system had 
its limitations too, namely in the state’s limited control 
over resources and population. As Chris Bayly has percep-
tively pointed out in the case of India, the push and pull 
between centripetal and centrifugal forces soon began to 
confront the Gorkhali rulers (Bayly 1983: 5-11). On top of 
the embezzlement of resources, the state increasingly had 
to contend with local elites who frequently diverted labor 
from directly administered land to their territories.20 Given 
that labor was already in short supply in the Tarai, repeat-
ed violations posed a grave challenge to expanding state 
power in this fertile region.21 In the hills, indiscriminate 
extraction of labor by the local rulers likewise threat-
ened the state’s access to its essential labor needs.22 The 
growing military threat posed by the expanding EIC and 
escalating inter-family power struggles only compounded 
the situation. Gorkhali rulers faced with such exigencies 
gradually initiated administrative and legal steps to assert 
state authority in order to mitigate centrifugal tendencies 
both within and outside the Durbar. King Rana Bahadur’s 
abdication letter of 1798 offers some glimpses into one 
such early attempt. Outlining specific procedures for 
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renewing office titles and grants, the letter pressed offi-
cials to remain loyal to the dhungo (state). It specifically 
stipulated that loyalty and honesty be rewarded, and called 
on officials to administer justice only from the court in the 
presence of other officials.23 The edict further entrusted 
loyal state officials to check irregularities, corruption and 
local excesses (Nepali 2057 VS: 113-114). The Pajani (annual 
review of office) system allowed to flush out recalcitrant 
local rulers and bring in trusted dependents and support-
ers. Under this system, the lands and titles assigned to ev-
ery office-holder were renewed annually.24 Herein we have 
evidence of an early attempt to penetrate local society not 
through a coercive force, but through an invocation of 
righteousness and justice.
As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
Gorkhali rulers sought to project state power through 
written laws.25 The construction of the Gorkhali authority 
seems to have functioned along two axes. It simultane-
ously incorporated multifarious groups on one axis of 
its expanding network through grants and titles, while 
subordinating them to rules crafted at the center on the 
other. To ensure the speedy delivery of administrative 
orders, the Gorkhali rulers regularly dispatched trusted in-
dividuals directly from the Durbar. For instance, one Shree 
Ram Khatri was deputed to the region west of Marsyangdi 
and east of Kumaon in 1798 to record local grievances and 
measure the effectiveness of regulations sent from Kath-
mandu. Khatri was given wide-ranging powers to check 
tax records, judicial processes, and to measure conformity 
to state sanctioned rules.26 One of his duties was to listen 
to people and record their grievances and complaints 
that were to be brought to the Palace for scrutiny, while 
judges who delayed passing verdicts were to be severely 
punished. Justice deliverance thus provided an ideological 
basis to re-work pre-existing relations of power, and to 
establish a closer relationship with rural populations.27
Regulating Society, Building State Authority 
The extant study of the Gorkhali state is influenced by the 
larger corpus of historical and anthropological work on 
Indian kingship (Appadurai 1977; Dirks 1987; Raheja 1988; 
Stein 1980; Dumont 1970; Hocart 1927). These studies have 
underscored gift-giving and ritual performance as consti-
tutive of South Asian kingship. A fixation with rituals and 
gift-giving as the defining axis of kingship has conversely 
limited our understanding of both state and caste forma-
tions in South Asia. Nicholas Dirks, whose otherwise influ-
ential work on the South Indian kingdom of Puddukotai 
that offered a critique of Dumont by interlinking political 
and ritual spheres, ended up emphasizing the cultural 
production of kingship via gift-giving at the expense of 
considerations of political economy. As Sumit Guha has 
pointed out, Dirks leaves “the social basis of the king’s 
power unclear” despite the fact that “Indian texts from 
early times knew that the king was but one element of 
the state and could not work without others” (Guha 2013: 
40). This latter point is amply demonstrated in the case 
of Nepal, where Gorkhali kings succeeded in projecting 
sovereignty through the intertwined strategies of liter-
ary and religious patronage, code promulgation, and the 
political manipulation of ritual and rank only by operating 
as the nucleus of complex and competing networks of kin, 
powerful individuals, sects, clients, and dependents. It was 
through such networks that they effectively projected 
power, accumulated information and resources, and ulti-
mately secured loyalty. 
State authority in Nepal, similar to the rest of pre-colonial 
South Asia, was not embodied in an individual monarch, 
who wielded and imposed pervasive power on hapless 
subjects. Neither did an individual ascend to the throne 
merely by virtue of descent.28 Even the question of pri-
mogeniture remained a contested field.29 An important 
work on gender and kinship formations in Muslim royal 
households also underscores this point for pre-colonial 
South Asia (Chatterjee 1999). State power was expressed 
and acted out through coalitions of individuals and groups 
comprising men and women from various lineages and 
strata of Gorkhali society. Having come to power with 
the help of powerful clans, the House of Gorkha since its 
inception in 1559 remained deeply embedded in a broad 
network of families (Baral 1964). 
As in Mughal India, individuals who aspired to become 
kings could not do so without building alliances with their 
kin, important men, and powerful women both within and 
outside of royal households (Faruqi 2012). Over time, such 
alliances and networks became the substance and sinews 
of the House of Gorkha. The Gorkhali state with the king 
at its head and supported by a network of dependents and 
supporters thus oversaw the maintenance of social order 
by extending gifts, but more importantly also by handing 
out punishment, sanctioning expiations, and overseeing 
caste purity in its legislative and judicial capacities. Purifi-
cation and expiation were however not only about meeting 
certain religious requirements as laid down in the classical 
law books, but were important sources of revenue and 
labor for the regime and its households, and official sala-
ries were frequently drawn out from these fines.30 Various 
edicts and orders issued by different Gorkhali rulers thus 
illustrate explicit political-economic considerations of pro-
jecting sovereignty, which in remote regions depended on 
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casting a wide network of trusted individuals and groups 
(secular and religious alike) both within and outside of the 
royal households (Wasti 2066 VS).
For example, as a part of the land grant that Gosain Hulas 
Giri received in the Bara and Rautahat region of the Tarai, 
he was required to build a monastery and settle people. 
Hulas Giri was also instructed to offer food and shelter to 
paupers and pilgrims.31 The public performance of reli-
gion thus seems to have transcended the religious realm 
and to have been tied to considerations of state-making. 
In bringing previously unused land into cultivation, such 
grants expanded the tentacles of state power (Guneratne 
2002: 56). Many state-supported pioneers in the Tarai in 
the process of clearing forest with new settlements fused 
the three separate frontiers of politics, economics, and 
religion into one.32 The Gorkhali state gradually brought 
those ritual gifts too within its legal and administrative 
purview.33 Brahmins receiving priesthood titles were sub-
jected to the regulatory power of the state and were often 
required to keep detailed information on ritual expenses 
and to provide relevant receipts to the state.34 The state 
even outlined categories of rituals, tabulating the precise 
amounts for procuring goods and services.35 Nor did the 
one time granting of lands or titles preclude the House of 
Gorkha from intervening in family disputes, succession 
rules, inheritance, and local excesses (Bouillier 1993; 1991). 
While the recipients of the religious grants were allowed 
to oversee minor infractions, the state reserved the sole 
prerogatives to decide on important cases. Violations of 
established marriage norms and venality risked grants 
being taken away from their recipients.36 To that end, even 
the highest ranked religious officials who failed to offer 
stipulated services were not spared the state’s cudgel.37 
At the same time, when secular officials encroached on 
religious endowments, the state intervened swiftly to 
protect such property.38 Interestingly, the Gorkhali kings 
time and again endowed and patronized temples, monas-
teries, mosques, and ascetic shelters irrespective of their 
individual beliefs. In 1791 the state awarded a grant to 
one Chabang Nyamgyal Lama to perform the “daily ritual 
of the Lord Buddha,” and also authorized him to collect 
different levies to maintain the monastery.39 Similar pa-
tronage was extended to the descendants of the Kashmiri 
trader Sadullah Mojoamji, who were granted the authority 
to enjoy the property and oversee the Muslim holy shrine 
adjacent to Rani Pokhari (Panta 1968: 1059). The state also 
patronized different shamanic and animistic practices.40 
These evidences render the concept of a ‘Hindu-only’ 
system rather quixotic (Levi 2005). It speaks to a growing 
cosmopolitanism that marked the Gorkha kingdom where 
people of different cultic traditions, and traders from as far 
as Armenia, Tibet, and India crisscrossed the region (Vani-
ni 1977). State authority had to encompass them all.
Building a successful network entailed more than just 
awarding grants and patronage; it concurrently involved 
a complex process of managing different groups’ claims to 
past rights and services. For example, when Subba Jarobar 
Khawas took the birta (tax free land) grant of Shakti Bal-
banda Upadhyaya in 1792, the reigning king re-issued the 
grant and ordered Khawas to stop troubling Shakti.41 Sim-
ilarly, when Laxmi Dhar Pandit of Tanahu and Goreshwor 
Aryal of Makwanpur appealed to the Durbar respectively 
claiming their ancestral rights to the same land, the latter 
ruled in favor of Laxmi Dhar Pandit and ordered Dinanath 
Upadhyaya, an officer deputed to the region, to hand over 
the land and any outstanding income to Laxmi Dhar.42 In 
due time, through successful management of such rights 
and claims, the nascent Gorkhali state expanded its reach 
to encompass many aspects of the socio-economic order. 
By the closing decade of the eighteenth century the scope 
of regulatory orders and codes had increased considerably. 
In 1791, the state drew the attention of officers in Sap-
tari to hardships suffered by tenants with the imposition 
of ritual fees.43 The following year, the subba (official) of 
Saptari and Mahottari districts were ordered to investi-
gate complaints against local notables and to bring back 
the tenants who had fled from leasehold lands.44 When 
excesses committed by the local amali (tax collectors) led 
to depopulation in Tarai, the state immediately dismissed 
the said officials and replaced them with new amali.45 Soon 
the Gorkhali state began regulating inheritance rules, 
procedures for criminal trials, caste boundaries, and labor 
relations. This in turn expanded the reaches of the House 
of Gorkha to the intimate domains of households.46 For in-
stance, adoption systems and marriage rules were brought 
under the purview of the central regime overriding 
customary practices.47 The ability to shape many different 
social relations transformed the state into the ultimate 
guarantor and protector of rights against both familial and 
local threats in rural areas. This presented the state with a 
unique administrative and fiscal power to manage all kinds 
of socio-economic disputes. For instance, when a widowed 
Brahmin woman who was denied her husband’s property 
by her brother-in-law approached the Durbar, the state 
ruled in her favor by stipulating that as long as the woman 
remained loyal to her dead husband, she alone had the 
right to her dead husband’s property.48 This decision, while 
seemingly benevolent, in fact denied the woman’s right 
to property in case of re-marriage or a relationship with 
another man. Such highly gendered language and decision 
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vis-à-vis property inheritance was structured to maintain 
the boundaries of both caste and wealth, underscoring 
the centrality of marriage in the creation of rank and title 
that scholars have often overlooked (Rupakheti 2012). The 
growing power of the state even enabled it to gradually 
ignore customs and traditions as it expanded its bureau-
cratic and administrative muscles.49 
Especially in cases on property transactions, which were 
often marked by competing claims, adjudications of-
fered the state rare access to the inner domains of family 
relations, and became a major source of revenue. Caste 
regulations were another avenue through which the state 
expanded into the hinterland, where it came to control as-
pects of social life that had earlier been under the purview 
of local communities. Governing caste was invariably tied 
to the labor and fiscal needs of the Gorkhali state (Hamil-
ton 1971: 218). For instance, a decision to impose fines on 
Bhote and Murmi castes for consuming beef meat seems 
hardly to have been driven by religious prejudice alone, as 
a large sum of revenue was passed on to the Durbar from 
its enforcement.50 Not surprisingly, the state preferred 
imposing fines to instating a blanket prohibitory order, 
which remained a favored method in Bhadgaon as late as 
1809. Though killing of cows were prohibited after 1806 in 
Solukhumbu region, the order allowed for several excep-
tions (Ortner 1978: 17).51 Given the regular need of animal 
hides in state munitions, an absolute ban was not desirable. 
Thus, when the local officials punished the carrion-eating 
groups in the area around Rukum’s munitions factory, the 
regime in Kathmandu reprimanded the officials. It ruled 
that as long as the respective groups provided hides to 
the local munitions factory they should not be fined and 
demanded that any fines collected be returned.52 However, 
those failing to supply the stipulated animal products were 
liable to financial dues.53 
By linking rights to perform certain labor services to a new 
symbolic order, the emerging state re-defined caste-state 
relations. One 1805 order outlined new dietary and eligi-
bility criterion for Gurungs to participate in the military 
labor market.54 In doing so, wide-ranging commensal 
practices were simply subsumed under a state rule thereby 
overriding complex internal group stratification (Pignede 
1962; Ragsdale 1990). This also prevented the diversion 
of precious resources from adjudicating sub-jati (caste) 
disputes and conflicts.55 Such linking of economic and 
political rights to certain ritual and dietary requirements 
soon set in process an internal regulation by the members 
themselves (Nepali 2022 VS: 191).56 
Nor were higher-ranked groups exempted from such po-
licing. When Jaisi Brahmins in 1812 were found to have not 
observed the caste and professional code of conduct (ear-
lier legislated by Prithvi Narayan Shah), new regulations 
were issued detailing which segments of the community 
were allowed to teach the Vedas or accept religious dona-
tions (Acharya 2061 VS: 519-525; J.C. Regmi 2036 VS: 202-
203). Though they were allowed to oversee ritual functions 
at their own homes, they were not to perform any rituals 
elsewhere. Likewise the Dharmadhikari (ritual preceptors), 
as salaried employees of the state, were required to follow 
state approved guidelines in overseeing caste related cases. 
Social relations were not trans-historical fossilized entities; 
instead they were reshaped and sustained through elab-
orate legal provisions in the thick of state-making. Given 
the centrality of artisanal labor in the state-making pro-
cess, the state often dealt with them directly. For example, 
some blacksmith families were given the right to collect 
levies on ploughs in return for offering their labor to the 
state-operated munitions factories.57 In a similar fashion, 
one Bhaju Ram Nau was given authority to oversee all the 
members of the barber caste in the Gorkhali domain; in re-
turn he was required to supply barbers to the troops across 
the kingdom as needed.58 Ram Din Mochi and Hima Mochi 
in another instance were granted authority to oversee all 
the leatherworkers between Bara-Parsa in the west and 
Bardiya in the east.59 The two grantees were ordered to 
perform their traditional duty and supply hides as directed 
by state officials. Likewise Chudyaras (Muslim bangles mak-
ers) were exempted from forced labor and allotted jagir 
(emolument) land in return for pledge to supply bangles 
to the Palace.60 The gift giving thus incorporated not just 
the powerful but also the powerless as the state was being 
constituted. 
Technologies of Governance
The administration of justice under Gorkhali kingship has 
received little attention in historiography. As early as 1805, 
courts were established in the mofussil (countryside), by 
which time Kathmandu already had four major courts with 
clearly demarcated judicial and administrative duties (J. 
C. Regmi 1979). Following the establishments of mofussil 
courts, the judges appointed to the mid-western region 
were ordered to refer to royal decrees when adjudicating 
cases, thereby overriding the prevailing practice of letting 
the local potentates oversee such functions.61 Judges were 
also required to bring all the disputing parties to the court 
and weigh their testimonies before passing verdicts.62 By 
stipulating procedures and punishments in advance, the 
state hoped to close off the possibility of misappropriation 
and individual rendering of verdicts, thus limiting local 
officials’ capacity to manipulate the outcome of judicial 
cases for financial and personal gains. To ensure that the 
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appointed judges abided by the written stipulations two 
additional individuals were deputed in the region.63 This 
redundancy in administrative duties was an intentional 
and common practice that served as a check on officials.64 
From the second decade of the nineteenth century, the 
rulers in Kathmandu began to bar local rulers from over-
seeing cases of pancha-khat (major offenses).65 Judges were 
dispatched regularly from the center to preside over and 
collect fines related to serious crimes. A closer examina-
tion of these administrative-legal interventions offers 
glimpses into Gorkhali innovations in governance. In 1811, 
when the state discovered that local elites in Garhwal 
had resorted to the extra-judicial enslavement of sexual 
offenders, it set new rules for handling sexual offences 
that disallowed local rulers to enslave offenders.66 Only the 
state reserved the right to enslave people for sexual of-
fenses, and such enslaved individuals were frequently em-
ployed for both productive and reproductive labor in the 
palace complexes.67 In cases where local headmen colluded 
with regional officers, locals were encouraged to report 
the excesses at the Durbar. Thus, when the people of Theni 
complained against their local magistrate, the regime re-
called the latter and assigned the villages in thek-bandi (tax 
farming).68 Later when the local people again complained 
that the jetha buda (village headman) exacted more than 
the amount allowed in the contract, the center instructed 
a different judge, Hira Nanda Jaisi, to look into the mat-
ter and to report the case to Durbar through judge Jalim 
Singh.69 The Gorkhali rulers likewise did not hesitate to 
deal with the highest-ranking officials who overstepped 
their official boundaries, as evinced in Kaji (minister) Jash 
Upadhyaya being warned for punishing tax-paying tenants 
in Chayanpur.70 Upadhyaya had gone against convention 
by charging additional fees for renewing the tenants’ con-
tract, and the local collective Limbu-Subba-Rai elites had 
accordingly informed the state of his misdeeds. Upadhyaya 
was then ordered to return all the fines immediately and 
warned of severe punishment should complaints against 
him recur. In another instance, when the locals of Doti 
complained to the Durbar of illegal dues demanded by one 
blacksmith Dilyalo on the instruction of royal kin member 
Pushkar Shah, the state instructed Shah to replace the 
blacksmith and return the collected dues to the villagers.71 
Similarly, when the state discovered in 1819 that local 
power holders in Majh-Kirat had gone about punishing 
people as they pleased, it issued a detailed description to 
the petitioning state officials to oversee criminal cases and 
exact the appropriate punishment. It is worth mentioning 
that the key component of the order was only the state ap-
pointed judges were authorized to oversee criminal cases 
as outlined in the regulation.72
The power and the swiftness with which the regime in-
tervened in local affairs achieved several targets. First, it 
allowed the ruling families to regulate and control many 
different aspects of society. As the frequency of such com-
plaints increased it allowed the nascent state to expand its 
administrative and bureaucratic arms. Second, by fre-
quently punishing officials, the regime was able to localize 
such excesses and project itself as the ultimate authority 
while obfuscating the structural inequality built in the sys-
tem.73 An important regulation from 1826 outlined an orga-
nized approach to check the power of the highest-ranking 
officials who had hitherto escaped prosecution owing to 
their status (HMG 2022 VS: 704-706). Dal Bhanjan Pandey 
was appointed to oversee the prosecution of state officials 
regardless of the status of the petitioner. The order tasked 
Pandey to weigh evidence and oral testimonies from both 
sides before deciding a case. In addition to the empha-
sis on evidence, two key features stand out in this royal 
regulation: the invocation of the idea of loyalty not to a 
particular ruler but to the state, and the reliance on non-
kin members to oversee this important judiciary process 
(Nepali 1965: 20). This continued emphasis on loyalty and 
the incorporation of both personnel and regulations in the 
emerging state system enabled the Gorkhali rulers to bring 
in trusted administrators to take charge of various judicial 
affairs. 
Another important charter that was granted to Prime 
Minister Rana Jung Pandey in 1837 reminded him to resist 
the influence of royal collaterals, priests, and high-ranking 
officials in judicial decisions.74 Such legislative orders sug-
gest the state was not likely to have been perceived as the 
ruthless, unapproachable power it has often been depicted 
as. For instance, when a dispute broke out between two 
Lamas over the rights to priestly functions in the region 
of Atharasayakhola, each called on the state to resolve the 
matter. After carefully examining the oral and documen-
tary evidence, the state awarded the rights to the family of 
Dorje Lama.75 The rural population frequently called on the 
state to protect its traditional rights and titles from attacks 
within and outside of the concerned families. An aggrieved 
party unsatisfied with the local resolution or with the 
verdict of court could then approach the Durbar. In this 
regard, one of the responses to Hogdson’s questionnaire is 
revealing here.76 Hogdson’s Nepali informers, commenting 
on the authority of the judges in the Nepali court, drew an 
interesting contrast with the European system to highlight 
that the judges’ decisions were not final, and could be ap-
pealed to the Durbar (Hogdson 1880: 211-250). But Hogdson 
and subsequent scholars failed to probe this layered aspect 
of the Nepali justice system. People, driven by a confi-
dence in the power of state to right the wrong committed 
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by even the highest-ranking officials, often traveled a 
considerable distance in pursuit of justice. This is evident 
in the complaint of two individuals from the central Terai 
against Dalmardan Shah, an influential member of the 
Gorkha royalty, whom they claimed had unlawfully con-
fiscated their land and manipulated local judicial process 
in his favor.77 After dispatching officials from the center to 
look into the matter, the Durbar eventually restored the 
confiscated property. When another high-ranking state of-
ficial encroached on Guthi (religious) land in 1819 and the 
custodians of the title travelled to Durbar seeking justice, 
the state looking into the matter immediately restored the 
property.78 Such periodic interventions by the state gradu-
ally built its legitimacy in rural areas to project itself as the 
ultimate fountain of justice.
Over time, such relations became the vehicle for expand-
ing the nascent state’s power into areas that were histor-
ically dominated by competing interest groups. It was not 
the performance of elaborate Vedic rituals and temple 
building projects, but rather politically crafted legal-ad-
ministrative interventions at the center that rooted the 
Gorkhali state in its wider social milieu. Both colonial ad-
ministrators and modern scholars, in focusing on the ‘Hin-
du’ aspects of laws and polity, have missed the ‘great arch’ 
of the nineteenth century Himalayan state-making proj-
ect.79 The foregoing discussion dispels the static notion of 
rule in eighteenth and nineteenth century Nepal to com-
plicate the dominant and exclusive image of the ‘state’ as 
a revenue sponge. Nepali state not only collected revenue, 
but also legislated, adjudicated, gathered information, and 
penetrated local society to build its sovereignty. A brief 
discussion of state-society relations addressed in this essay 
should allow for re-thinking colonialism or modernization 
(post-1951) as the only harbingers of change in Nepal. As 
Indrani Chatterjee demonstrates in a recent monograph on 
monastic governmentality, the elision of local agency from 
the pre-colonial period has done epistemic violence to the 
South Asian past (Chatterjee 2013). A careful reading of 
indigenous sources is one way to re-conceptualize multiple 
locations of change in South Asian societies. 
Conclusion
The early modern Gorkha state is best understood if we 
move beyond the paradigms set by colonial and nation-
alist scholarship. It was a state built out of negotiations 
and accommodations with various individuals and groups 
that was deeply entangled with—and drew legitimacy 
from—local and existing relations of power. While con-
quests and military campaigns played a supportive role, 
social control and consolidation of regime power could 
not proceed solely on the heels of war machines. Instead, 
it involved a complex process of managing past claims to 
rights, regulating social order, and legislating a series of 
administrative and judicial functions. The absorption of 
numerous intermediaries during the formative state of 
the state-building process represents a range of political 
priorities and suggests a state being constructed from 
bottom up, just as several important works have illustrated 
for different regions across South Asia (Bayly 1983; Hasan 
2004; Kulke 1995; Wink 1986; Yang 1989). 
As it responded to its entanglement with internal and 
external social forces, the Gorkhali state put together, 
piece by piece, a novel Hindu polity out of a plural soci-
ety along the Himalayan foothills. The management of 
rituals, embedded in the politico-economic imperatives of 
the period, was an important source of revenue and labor 
for the state and its households. Thus the control of that 
domain remained intimately tied to the regulation of social 
order and rank that underlay eighteenth century Gorkhali 
state-making, which parallels similar developments in the 
Maratha polity (Fukazawa 1998; Guha 2013). Like many 
pre-colonial societies in South Asia, the early Gorkhali 
state was simultaneously coercive and consensual, ex-
tractive and re-distributive, and it also incorporated lower 
strata of society with various incentives to tap artisanal 
labor, particularly echoing Sahai’s work on pre-colonial 
Rajasthan (Sahai 2006).80 Most importantly, the frequen-
cy and volume of complaints reaching the Durbar from a 
cross-section of Nepali population equally problematizes 
the received notion of that society being ruled by arbitrary 
system. State-building in Nepal, as has been demonstrated 
in other regions throughout the subcontinent, was marked 
by the expansion of both legal and moral authority of the 
state that came to encompass many aspects of socio-po-
litical lives (Guha 2003; Singh 2003). Gorkhali statecraft, 
being built on a justice administration with interventions, 
including but not limited to the realm of caste and rituals, 
was reflective of the ongoing attempts made by various 
regional rulers to project sovereignty in the midst of 
political-economic flux of the eighteenth century (Guha 
2013; Peabody 2002; Rai 2004; Wink 1981). The examples 
explored here thus signal remarkable continuities in the 
social-political histories of Himalayan terrain with that of 
the peninsular societies. In briefly highlighting one such 
interconnectedness along the Himalayan foothills, the 
essay urges scholars of South Asia—in particular national-
ist and post-colonial historians—to not treat colonial and 
national boundaries as being impermeable to history. 
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1. For a broader discussion on the colonial informational 
regimes, see (Bayly 2007; Cohn 1996; Inden 1990).
2. HC/Vol. 1, ff: 27-29.
3. This picture of the Gorkhali state remains a dominant 
leitmotif in some of the recent works too. See (Riaz & Basu 
2007).
4. D. R. Regmi wrote, “Prithvi Narayan Shah was a 
nationalist at the core of his heart. With him, if conquest 
was the aim of life, patriotism was the guiding factor for 
any action”. See (D. R. Regmi, 1975: 100).
5. See (Regmi, 1963 [1977]: 10-11).
6. Richard Burghart’s now widely cited work on the 
Nepali state-formation is one such example of theoretical 
speculation. Burghart’s central argument that the Nepali 
rulers made categorical distinction between three 
different notions of their realm is not much supported by 
the administrative and legislative records. 
7. It is also important to emphasize that there are notable 
exceptions to this, in particular the works of David 
Holmberg (1989) on Tamang, Arjun Guneratne (2002) 
on Tharus, and Nancy Levine (1987). These illustrate 
the political-economic forces in the formation of ethnic 
identities in Nepal.
8. Few works published in Nepali language have discussed 
the political-economic aspects of law making in the Ain. 
See (Gautam 2004; Pangeni 2007).
9. A similar motif of collaboration with local power 
holders of Dolkha in Eastern Nepal is evident in 1760. See 
(Vajracarya & Gyanmani Nepal 2014 BS: 25).
10. Even the British colonial rule in India was not an 
exception to this. See (Bayly 1983; Yang 1989).
11. NT/1907 BS, ff: 3-4; Rajpatra/2019 BS [1962], Vol.3, No: 
7, ff: 2-3.
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of Kipat system, see (Forbes 1995).
13. “Order to Dev Pati Rai, Sakha Rai, Jab Jit Rai”. LM/1849. 
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Khawas”. LM/1848 BS [1791-92] PN. 6, SN. 1996. Sen 
Dynasty of Makwanpur was a powerful chiefdom that was 
in competition with the House of Gorkha to control the 
southern territory.
15. “Royal Order addressed to Subba Jarobar Khawas of 
Saptari and Mahottari”. LM/1848 BS [1791-92] PN. 3.
16. “Land Grant to Gosain Jamuna Giri”. LM/1855-56 BS 
[1798-1799]. On the role of Gosain in South Asian state 
formations see (Pinch 2006).
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to finance the sacred thread investiture ceremonies 
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the expiation of caste offenses. We also confirm your 
authority to grant or confiscate birta lands and to collect 
judicial fines, escheats and fees for stamping weights and 
measures. You shall pay only Rs. 701 whenever a new King 
ascends our throne. When a new King ascends your throne, 
you shall have authority to collect customary payments 
from your people.”
18. This parallels similar agrarian relations prevalent in 
the pre-colonial Maratha state (Grover 2006).
19. “Regulations for Tarai”. LM/1837 BS [1780-1781], PN. 
83, SN. 5175. 
20. “Order highlighting the problem of labor shortage in 
Terai”. LM/1866 BS [1809-1810], BN. 29, PN. 8, SN. 33, f. 26.
21. LM/1849 BS [1791-1792], PN 3. The order assures 
the tenants who have fled to return and pay a fixed tax 
rate with protection against future exploitations by local 
amalidars. 
22. “Order to local potentates not to extract unpaid labor”. 
LM/1865 BS [1808-1809], PN. 6, SN. 1996, f. 61. 
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23. Prithvi Narayan Shah, in his Divya Upadesh, had made 
similar pleas to his descendants and trusted officials to 
deliver justice through court system. To ensure state 
impartiality in judicial process, he even warned not to 
deposit the revenue thus collected to the state treasury. 
See (Acharya & Naraharinath 2061 BS: 47).
24. Subba Dasarath Khatri was instructed to award offices 
to those who took the initiative in settling virgin land. 
The royal order also approved the pajani register prepared 
by Khatri for the districts of Bara, Parsa and Rautahat. 
LM/1851 BS [1794-1795], PN. 83, SN. 5103.
25. Rana Bahadur Shah promulgated another set 
of extensive regulations in 1806. With forty clauses 
encompassing various issues from administration, 
corruption, caste-sexual regulation, control of slavery, the 
fixing of interest rates, and checks on local excesses, the 
code was unprecedented at the time. (See Panta 2026 BS).
26. LM/1855 BS [1798]. 
27. “Order granting Ijara to Darbi Singh Newar”. In the 
contract granted to Newar the state included a provision 
to waive tax burden on the local peasantry in the event 
of natural calamities interfering with their agricultural 
output. LM/1850 BS [1793], BN.4, PN. 1, SN. 6.
28. Norbert Peabody, in a classical study of the Hindu 
kingdom of Kota, shows how claims to kingship in pre-
colonial South Asia were not limited to biological descent 
(Peabody 2003: 37-49).
29. A long and protracted intra-family dynastic struggle 
that convulsed the House of Gorkha immediately following 
the conquest of the Kathmandu Valley, which saw its most 
violent apogee in Kot Massacre of 1846, was illustrative of 
this. For an elaboration of this theme see (Acharya 2063 
BS).
30. DNA/11/47. Jai Nar Singh Newar was awarded an ijara 
(contract) to collect fines for three years between 1791-
1794 in the locality of Thate mine (LM/1848 BS [1791-1792], 
PN. 3). Hamilton had also noted that various fines collected 
on bodily and ritual violations constituted a significant 
portion of revenue for the state (Hamilton 1971: 218). For 
instance, the following salary were met from the fines 
collected: Tahasildar, Rs. 50; Thabildar, Rs. 35; Bahidar, Rs 
35; Pyadas, Rs 25 (RRC 38: 699-700).
31. “Land Grant to Hulas Giri”. LM/1849 BS [1792-1793], 
PN. 3.
32. For a seminal work outlining this process in the Bengal 
Delta under the Mughals, see (Eaton 1993)
33. The statewide confiscation of birta (religious land 
grant) in 1805 is one such case; see (Nepali 2057 BS).
34. DNA/12/4; DNA/12/50. 
35. LM/1855-56 VS [1798-1800], ff: 38-40. Bir Bhadra Pandit 
was required to observe the state prescribed rituals.
36. State reserved the final authority to confirm the 
parcellation of property as it did when Mahant Trilok Giri 
passed away and his property was distributed amongst his 
descendants taking into account that they had not violated 
the established code for Das Nami sect. LM/1849.
37. State astrologers who regularly failed at predicting 
and preventing omens were severely punished (Vajracarya 
1980: 248-256).
38. Local officials who had confiscated property belonging 
to the monastery of one Sakhya Lama were punished and 
the property was restored. LM/1849 BS [1792-1793], PN 3.
39. LM/1849 BS [1791-1792], PN 3.
40. Order to Somai Dhami authorizing him to collect ritual 
expenses”. NA/FMD/1/67
41. LM/1849 VS [1792-1793], PN. 3.
42. “Order to Dinanath Upadhyaya to reinstate the land 
belonging to Laxmi Dhar” LM/1851 BS [1794-1795], PN. 83, 
SN. 5103.
43. “Order to Indra Mani Basnet and Garva Khawas to 
check local exploitation”. LM/1848 BS [1791-1792], PN. 3.
44. LM/1848 BS [1791-1792], PN. 3.
45. LM/1851 BS [1794-1795], PN. 83, SN. 5103
46. ‘Regulations for Limbu”. LM/1866 BS [1809-1810]/ 
BN. 29, PN. 8, SN. 33. The order warned the Limbus of 
Chayanpur not to collect more than Rs. 50 and demand 
slaves as bride price.
47. LM/1851 VS [1794-1795], PN. 83, SN. 5103. When one 
Chapan Singh Khatri complained that distant members 
of his agnatic clan had taken his ancestral property the 
central regime intervened and passed a verdict, which 
stated that as long as a son of the deceased member of 
the agnatic clan was alive others could not inherit the 
property.
48. LM/1876 BS [1819-1820], BN. 51, PN. 14, SN. 37, f. 2.
49. An 1809 royal order of King Girvana disallowed the 
practice of slavery in the border regions adjoining Tarai 
and Tibet even though such practices had been prevalent 
since ancient times (Naraharinath 1966: 68-69).
50. In the year 1809 between Rs 12,00 to Rs 15,000 was 
estimated as an income for the state from the rigorous 
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implementation of the ban on cow slaughter in Bhadgaon 
area. RRS 1: 16.
51. Yaks were excluded from the category of cows in 
extreme northern regions. In many places consumption 
of beef was allowed if the animal had fallen off the cliff. 
Local people might have utilized this exception to their 
advantage. Also if the cow was killed accidentally while 
herding, the person was only fined (Rs. 1) as long as the 
state was informed of the incident.
52. LM/1866 BS [1809], f. 7.
53. The fines on Cobblers were rated at 4 paisa while other 
carrion consuming jatis were fined 2 paisa. LM/1853 BS 
[1795], f. 113.
54. Gurungs partaking in beef eating were barred from 
military service. The order interestingly did not make 
reference to any past order or Shastras as a precedence for 
the new regulations thus being enforced. 
55. In 1811, the regime ruled that all Gurungs were free to 
participate in commensal relations with each other and to 
marry freely within the jati without losing their jati status. 
Anyone refusing to respect these rules and asserting 
higher status within the jati was subject to punishment 
and a fine of Rs. 20. DNA/12/53.
56. When influential Magars requested the Durbar to 
have their caste rules and regulations enacted, a new 
rule was stipulated. It prohibited Magars from taking 
food from those lower in the caste hierarchy. Members 
found violating the commensality rule were to be ex-
communicated. 
57. LM/1848 BS [1791], PN. 3.
58. LM/1878 BS [1821-1822], BN. 53, PN. 14, SN. 39, f. 37.
59. LM/1883 BS [1826-1827], BN. 58, PN. 16, SN. 79, f. 18.
60. This order is from the year 1781 (RRC 5: 618-619). The 
state issued two separate orders in 1826 warning the local 
officials who had coerced Chudyaras for unpaid labor labor 
(RRC 37: 186).
61. Parshu Ram Joshi and Haji Ram Joshi were appointed 
judges with the jurisdiction to oversee the region between 
west of Chepya-Marsyangdi River and east of Bheri and 
ordered to refer to the royal decrees when adjudicating 
cases (RRC 9:323).
62. LM/1866 [1809]/BN. 29, PN. 8, SN.33
63. Krishna Kanta Lohani and Uma Kanta Jaisi Sapkota 
were not given any specific office titles, but the amalidars 
(tax officials) in the region were informed that the two 
were authorized to ensure the effectiveness of the royal 
regulations (RRC 2: 86). 
64. The Ranas implemented this with even greater rigor 
after 1846 (Bhattarai 2059 BS; Gautam 2004; Pangeni 2064 
BS).
65. Pancha khat (five major criminal offences) included: 
killing of a Brahman; cow, woman; infant, and unlawful 
sexual intercourse, such as incest).
66. RRC 40: 349
67. The official records speak clearly of slave girls 
becoming sati at the death of reigning kings. NA/
DNA/14/41. This particular record from 1777 states that 
eight Palace slave women committed sati when King 
Pratap Singh died. Slaves at times were also handed out by 
the state as salary to its officials (RRC 5: 716).
68. The state’s appeal to the local people to return to 
their village assured them that they would not be under 
the jurisdiction of said judge, and requested to deposit 
the assigned revenue directly with Subba Bhavani Dutta 
Thapa. LM/1866 BS [1809], f. 56.
69. LM/1866 BS [1809-1810], f. 81. The state instructed that 
if the case could not be resolved, the concerned parties 
were to be dispatched to Kathmandu.
70. LM/1878 BS [1821-1822], BN. 53, PN. 14, SN. 39, f. 36.
71. LM/1883 BS [1827-1828], BN. 58, PN. 16, SN. 79, f. 21.
72. LM/1876 BS [1819-1820], BN. 51, PN. 14, SN. 37, f. 38.
73. One of the examples of this was when the state 
began to disallow local officials and powerholders from 
extracting coerced labor without prior approval from the 
Durbar. At the same time, the state reserved the right to 
mobilize such labor as it deemed necessary for various 
projects of state building.
74. FMD/1/66, f. 2.
75. RRC 62: 92-94
76. The questionnaires were directed to the local 
informers employed by Hogdson to help him record court 
proceedings in Nepal. 
77. Narmadeshwor Dhakal and Rupnarayan Dhakal 
approached the Court with a complaint against Dalmardan 
Shah when the latter confiscated their birta land. 
The regime ordered Sardar Shambhu Lal and Subedar 
Hansamani Khawas to look into the matter and inform the 
Durbar of its findings. LM/1851 BS [1794-1795], PN. 83, SN. 
5103.
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78. “Order to Ranbir Thapa to Restore Guthi Land”. 
LM/1876/BN. 51, PN. 14, SN. 37.
79. I borrow this term from Corrigan & Sayer who 
have highlighted a similar expansion of legal and moral 
authority of the state in pre-modern England. See 
(Corrigan & Sayer 1985).
80. This characterization of the early Gorkhali state thus 
also elides the definition of ‘feudal’, for an interesting 
discussion of which, see (Mukhia 1999).
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